

Gandhi's *Satyagraha*: A Pragmatic Linguistic Analysis of Its Meanings

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Abstract

In the search for the ultimate truth, the end of human injustice, and in the longing for a more peaceful world, Mohandas K. Gandhi, the Great Mahatma, developed his perpetual masterpiece, the concept and movement of Satyagraha. However, the existing works on Gandhi's Satyagraha have examined only the surface meanings of the concept. Proposing that the term Satyagraha entails a great deal of auxiliary contents as well, this paper is a pragmatic analysis of the concept within a linguistic framework. To accomplish this task, the paper comprises discussions of the historical context, deixis, presuppositions, implicatures, and speech acts of the seven qualifications for Satyagraha. The major thesis of this paper is that analyses of the concept of Satyagraha that fail to account for pragmatic linguistic features risk ignoring relevant contents that may be central to the concept's meanings.

Keywords: *Satyagraha, Nonviolence, Peace, Pragmatic*

Introduction

Not new to the world, but novel in form and content, the Great Mohandas K. Gandhi developed the concept and a surrounding philosophy on living in *Satyagraha*, which would change the notion of non-violence and transform the already existing idea of *passive resistance*. For Gandhi, there are only two ways of changing human social ills: i.e. either by violence or by nonviolence. He chose the latter as his essential remedy for India's ills, both internal and external (Mathews 1989:65). Anchored on truth, love, compassion, patience and suffering, the term was developed by Gandhi in 1906 while in South Africa to combat the traits of injustice and discrimination, influenced by the Christian reading, the Sermon on the Mount, as well as the following verse of the Gujarati poem, which had a profound impact on him as a child:

For a bowl of water to give a goodly meal;
For a kindly greeting bow thou down with zeal;
For a simple penny pay thou back with gold;
If thy life be rescued, life do not withhold.
Thus the words and actions of the wise regard;
Every little service tenfold they reward.
But the truly noble know all men as one,
And return with gladness good for evil done (Mathews 1989:66).

As such, *Satyagraha* evolved as a term that conveys truth and love in the fight against the untruth through a path of suffering, patience, compassion and understanding. It is the matchless weapon—*Satyagraha*.

Existing meanings of *Satyagraha*

According to Diwakar, the word *Satyagraha*, of Sanscrit origin, is a compound word formed from *Satya*, which means “truth,” and *Agraha*, meaning “holding fast,” “adherence,” or “insistence.” As such, Diwakar observed, it has come to denote the meanings of clinging to truth, holding fast to truth, or insistence on truth. The term *Satya* itself, Diwakar noted, is derived from *Sat*, which means “being” or “that which exists.” Thus, the word *Satya*, Diwakar suggested, has come to entail “that which is in accordance with *Sat* or being,” that is “truth,” therefore, that which is in accordance with truth (1948:1).

As Gandhi explained, “the term *Satyagraha* was coined by me in South Africa to express the force that the Indians there used for full eight years and it was coined in order to distinguish it from the movement then going on in the United Kingdom and South Africa under the name of Passive Resistance” (1961:6). For Diwakar, although he initially used the term *passive resistance*, Gandhi later “felt ashamed of using an English word, which was neither easily understood nor used as current coin by our people” (Diwakar 1948:1). He felt that the movement he had started was essentially different from that of passive resistance and, thus, deserved a different denomination, such as *Satyagraha* (Diwakar 1948:1). The term *Satyagraha* was intended to express the essence and nature of the Indian struggle: namely, “Truth-Force,” or the force born of truth and love or nonviolence (Diwakar 1948:2). In essence, following Mathews, *Satyagraha* was to entail Truth-Force, Soul-Force, A Firm Grasp Upon Truth, Insistence on Truth or the Vindication of Truth, as the power of the soul, which fights for what is true in the search for justice, peace, and love (Mathews 1989:67).

In addition, according to Mathews, an important symbol used by Gandhi to describe *Satyagraha* was the coin: “one side being love” and “the other truth,” thereby describing the two essential sides which form *Satyagraha* (Mathews 1989:7). At the same time, for Mathews, Gandhi also believed *Satyagraha* to be “indefinable” in its fullest, as it was conceived by him to be “a science in the making,” an ever growing knowledge, which time could not grasp (Mathews 1989:67). As such, Mathews concluded, Gandhi often compared the concept to the sun, which “cannot be adequately described” (Mathews 1989:67). Thus, this essay seeks to tease out the deeper meanings of *Satyagraha* by employing a pragmatic linguistic approach.

A pragmatic linguistic analysis

This section entails a pragmatic analysis of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi* delineated by Gandhi within a linguistic framework. Linguistic pragmatics has been generally defined by Stephen Levinson as “the study of language usage” (1983:5). The subject matter of this essay is pragmatics—an approach that is attributable to language philosopher Charles Morris (1938), who sought to outline the general shape of a science of signs, or *Semiotics*. In its essence, pragmatics is the study of meaning from the point of view of language users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interactions, and the effects their uses of language have on other participants in an act of communication. The study of pragmatics can be divided into two major categories: (1) *Applied Pragmatics* deals with verbal interactions in such domains as medical interviews, language teaching, judicial sessions, etc., where problems of communication are vital; (2) *General Pragmatics* deals with the principles governing the communicative uses of language, especially as encountered in conversations.

What pragmaticists cover has become so enormous that to discuss all that goes under the rubric of pragmatics in dealing with a relatively short text (requirements for a *Satyagrahi*) is neither possible nor desirable. As such, this essay considers only the main topics in the Anglo-American linguistic tradition that builds directly, for the most part, on philosophical approaches to language of both logic and ordinary language variety. These topics include speech acts, deixis, presupposition, and implicature. A fifth topic is conversational structure, which is not dealt with in this essay simply because the text studied is not conversational.

The alternative approach is called the continental tradition. This approach is broader and includes much that is subsumed under the rubric of *Sociolinguistics*—a discipline that investigates the relationship between language and society.

The term linguistic framework as used here refers to a way of studying various aspects of human language and its interaction with other areas of human culture and behavior. This calls for collecting per-

tinient data concerning a range of linguistic phenomena, observing the patterns which underlie those phenomena, and expressing the observed regularities by means of certain linguistic rules.

By delineating the pragmatic features of the requirements, their philosophical symbolic meanings are teased out. According to Roger Cobb and Charles Elder, “a symbol is any object used by human beings to index meanings that are not inherent in, nor discernible from, the object itself” (1983:28). This is important because symbols, as some scholars have observed, are critical in promoting social integration, fostering legitimacy, inducing loyalty, gaining compliance, and providing citizens with security and hope (e.g., Edelman 1964, Jones 1964, Merelman 1966, Cobb and Elder 1976, Elder and Cobb 1983).

Also, an examination of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi* text clearly shows that like other textual symbols, it also conveys not only surface contents, but a great deal of auxiliary contents as well. Thus, the major thesis in this essay is the following: Analyses of peace philosophies or other textual symbols that fail to account for pragmatic features risk ignoring relevant contents that may be central to the texts’ meanings.

Consequently, this essay is also about the possibility that significant *functional* explanations of textual symbols can be evaluated using linguistic features. The essence of an approach of this nature was captured by Stephen Levinson when he suggested the following:

Most recent linguistic explanations have tended to be internal to linguistic theory: that is to say, some linguistic feature is explained by reference to other linguistic features, or to aspects of the theory itself. But there is another possible kind of explanation, often more powerful, in which some linguistic feature is motivated by principles outside the scope of linguistic theory (1983:40).

Thus, by employing pragmatic approaches to analyze the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*, the ideas underlying its text can be illuminated. This is possible because in the study of linguistic texts, as in the study of physics, special instruments, formulae, and laboratories beyond the grasp of the uninitiated can be utilized. Because one trained in linguistics possesses analytical skills and tools, and concepts that permit insights into the nature of language in general, s/he is in a better position than other analysts to explain the formal linguistic structures which constitute cues as to how Gandhi’s requirements for a *Satyagrahi* can be interpreted.

Thus, the major questions probed in this essay are the following: (1) What salient pragmatic features are imbedded in the text of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*? (2) How can the delineated pragmatic features be explained? In exploring these questions, the systematic application of discovery procedures well known in linguistic pragmatics will help to uncover propositions that will illuminate the text examined for current readers.

The following are Gandhi’s requirements for a *Satyagrahi* (in Mathews 1989:85):

1. He must have a living faith in God.
2. He must believe in truth and non-violence as his creed and, therefore, have faith in the inherent goodness of human nature which he expects to evoke by his truth and love expressed through his suffering.
3. He must be leading a chaste life and be ready and willing for the sake of his cause to give up his life and his possessions.
4. He must be a habitual khaki-wearer and spinner.
5. He must be a teetotaler and be free from the use of other intoxicants.
6. He must carry out with a willing heart all the rules of discipline as may be laid down from time to time.
7. He should carry out the jail rules unless they are especially devised to hurt his self-respect.

Historical Context of Satyagraha

The major purpose of this subsection is to discuss the historical context within which *Satyagraha* was developed by Gandhi. It is anticipated that this context will provide some background information that

will help to account for the types of pragmatic meanings embedded in the text. Before doing so, however, it makes sense to begin with a discussion of the essence of historical context.

According to David and Chava Nachmias (1981:87), the historical method involves the examination of related events occurring during the time the main event being studied took place. The strength of the historical method, as Babbie (1992:312) has pointed out, hinges on the fact that it is a qualitative approach employed to master many subtle details. The main sources for observation and analysis are historical records.

However, as Kaplan argued more than 30 years ago, “the historian does not provide us with a picture of the past, a representation of it ‘as it really was’ apart from any interpretations of his own; neither does any other scientist with respect to his subject matter” (1964:361). This is not to suggest, according to Kaplan, “that the historian must engage in the process of interpretation even to arrive at what are distinctively his data does not mean that his findings are doomed to subjectivity” (1964:361). Indeed, what the historian deals with is an affirmation about the event—an interpretation of an act as a certain act—that constitutes for the reader a historical fact.

In terms of textual analysis, Patterson suggested that the new interest in history stems from a polemic: “it derives its energy from a conviction that literary texts have always been, more or less, products of their historical, social, political, and economic environments and that they cannot be understood unless one attempts to re-situate them within those conditions” (1992:185). Thus, it is the historicist’s job to interpret texts in light of their original contexts.

Also, Hume identified four aspects of the historicist’s enterprise in interpreting literary texts. These four aspects are: (1) the collection of new facts and primary materials, (2) the contextual interpretation of facts, (3) the application of context to text, and (4) making contexts from texts (1996:2). Going from text to context, according to Hume, “helps sensitize us to the original, the abnormal, the subversive” (1996:2).

Indeed, without the notion of *context*, there would be no theory of pragmatics. This is one reason pragmatics calls for some explicit characterization of the concept of context, despite the difficulty encompassed in such an activity. This truism is captured by Schiffrin when she posited that

Discourse markers, contextualization cues, and sociolinguistic variables all have a contextualizing function. The markers are clues to the local contexts of utterances, contextualization cues to the interpretive schemas within which communicative intent is situated, and sociolinguistic variables to the social and expressive meanings of self, other, and situation. But because discourse markers are functionally linked to these other devices, the study of all these devices together can provide an emic guideline to speakers’ contextualization of language at several different levels at once (Schiffrin 1987:30).

For ethnomethodologists in particular, the analyzability of actions in context as a practical accomplishment is a must. As Garfinkel insisted, this must be the case because “not only does no concept of context-in-general exist, but every use of context without exception is itself essentially indexical” (1967:10). Ethnomethodologists are interested, therefore, less in the contribution to the conversational system made by the specific identities of the speakers and more in the contribution of immediate conversational context.

As Heritage (1984:242) stated, the significance of a speaker’s communicative action is doubly contextual in both *context-shaped* and *context-renewing*. Furthermore, he suggested that while these aspects of context are traceable to Garfinkel’s notions of indexical and reflexive characteristics of talk and action, they have also found some parallel expression in Goffman’s more ethnographically-oriented studies.

For Goffman (1974:496-497), context helps an analyst to rule out unintended meanings and suppress misunderstandings. And that the immediate surrounding could not have this power apart from the cultural competence of interpreters. In addition, he noted that the correct interpretation of any statement may have as one of its implications the saving of the interpreter from exposure as someone who presumes cultural and linguistic competence s/he does not possess.

This way of conceptualizing context can be thought of as a process whereby the native speaker of a given language produces contextually appropriate and internally coherent utterances—a process which involves a lot more than knowledge of the language system. Thus, the factors identified by a

system's framework as contextual must be those factors that determine the native speaker's production and interpretation of utterances in actual activities of use.

Another notion of context in Goffman's work (even though he did not call it so) is a *physical* one: the role of *setting* in performance. According to Goffman (1974:22), *setting* includes furniture, decor, physical layout, and other background items which provide the scenery and stage props for the spate of human action. *Setting* stays put, geographically speaking, so that those who use it as part of their performance cannot begin their act until they have brought themselves to the appropriate place and must end their performance upon their departure. Goffman's formulation of context is, indeed, pragmatic: It covers the identities of participants, the temporal and spatial parameters of speech events, the knowledge and metaknowledge, intentions and beliefs of the participants in those speech events. This makes context paramount in any analysis of meaning.

When Gandhi, as leader of the South African Indian Congress, a political party he formed in 1894 (Benson 1986:29), developed his philosophy of *Satyagraha* in South Africa in 1906, the country was in turmoil. The Bambatha Rebellion was underway in Natal. The British also granted colonial self-government to the Transvaal during that year, followed by the giving of the same status to the Orange Free State the subsequent year (i.e. 1907). This led to the creation of the Union of South Africa comprising of the four White settler colonies (Cape, Natal, Orange Free State and the Transvaal) in 1910, with Whites having complete power (Magubane 1979:47).

As Thompson and Prior pointed out, the Natal government operated exclusively in the interest of the White community. The partisan tax laws coupled with the partisan administration led to the small but alarming Bambatha Rebellion by the Africans (1982:30).

Magubane cited Edward Roux's characterization of the rebellion and the changeover from armed resistance to political struggle as follows:

The Bambatha Rebellion in Natal in 1906 may very well be taken as the turning point between two periods in the history of the black man in South Africa: The early period of tribal wars and fights against white invaders which ended in the loss of the country and the reduction of the Bantu to the status of an internal proletariat; and the second period, one of struggle for national liberation and democratic rights within the framework of present-day South Africa, where black and white intermingle in complex economic and political relationships. During the first period the Bantu fought as isolated tribes and on military lines. Though they did not meet the whites on equal terms, but opposed shield and assegai to the rifle and machine gun, at least they met them as members of independent tribes or nations having their own territory and military organization (Roux, cited in Magubane 1979:261).

In essence, 1906 was a year of melancholy strain. While Gandhi was developing his philosophy of *Satyagraha*, most non-Whites in South Africa were far from ready to entertain a philosophy of passive resistance while they were being killed and oppressed by Whites. Even Indians were suffering from South African Prime Minister General Jan Smuts' discriminatory measures against them, forcing some Indian leaders to later join the Communists.

Deixis

In this subsection, the deixis embedded in the text of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi* are discussed. The word *deixis*, as Lyons pointed out, comes from a Greek word meaning "pointing" or "indicating" and "is now employed in linguistics to refer to the function of personal and demonstrative pronouns, of tense and of a variety of other grammatical and lexical features which relate utterances to the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of the act of utterance" (1977:636). Thus, as Levinson later observed, the single most obvious way in which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the structures of languages is through deixis. Essentially, according to Levinson, deixis deals with the ways in which languages encode or grammaticalize features of the *context of utterance* or *speech event* and, therefore, also deals with ways in which the interpretation of utterances hinges upon the analysis of that context of utterance (1983:54). As Hoffman later stated, deictic or pointing words exist in all languages and are very useful for "referring" to objects around us (1993:61).

Combining traditional (1-3 below) and contemporary categorizations (4 and 5 below) of deixis, Levinson has developed the following five categories within which they can be subsumed (1993:62-63):

- (1) *Person deixis* encodes the *role* of participants in a speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered—i.e. *first person* encodes the speaker’s reference to her/himself, *second person* encodes the speaker’s reference to one or more addressees, and *third person* encodes the reference of persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question.
- (2) *Place or Space deixis* encodes spatial location *relative* to the location of the participants in the speech events—i.e. *proximal* encodes closeness to speaker, and *distal* encodes non-proximal or sometimes closeness to the addressee.
- (3) *Time deixis* encodes temporal points and spans *relative* to the time at which an utterance was spoken, or a written message inscribed—this time is referred to as *coding time* or CT, which is distinct from *receiving time* or RT.
- (4) *Discourse or Text deixis* encodes reference to portions of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance, which includes the text referring expression, is located.
- (5) *Social deixis* encodes social distinctions that are relative to participants-roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship holding between speaker and addressee(s) or speaker and some referent.

System in deixis, deictic context, demonstrative and the definite articles, anaphoras and cataphoras are not discussed here. The interested reader can consult Bangura (2000, 2002a, 2002b, and 2004).

The following deixis were delineated after examining the text of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*:

Type	Deixis
1. Deity or Supreme Being	God
2. Person	He
	His
	Human
	Khaki-wearer
	Spinner
	Teetotaler
3. Time	From time to time

Deity or Supreme Being, person, and time deixis exist in the text of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*. Discourse or text, place or space, and social deixis are absent. It should be noted that the Deity or Supreme Being deictic category is lacking in both traditional and contemporary works in linguistics. Thus, I have added this new deictic category made possible by the text examined for this essay.

The Deity or Supreme Being deixis refers to God. The person deixis comprise of two third-person pronouns (he and his) and four nouns. The four nouns refer to *Homo sapiens* (human), a wearer of dust-colored cloth made of cotton (khaki-wearer), one who draws out and twists fiber into yarn or thread (spinner) and one who practices or advocates complete abstinence from alcoholic drinks (teetotaler). And the time deixis suggests a future time.

Indeed, in order to interpret the preceding deictic forms, contextual knowledge about the Third World was required. Thus, deixis is not reducible to matters of truth-conditional semantics.

Presuppositions

The rhetorical tactic of presupposition in political discourse is by now familiar to many linguists. A paradigm example is the reporter’s query: “Did the President lie again about his reasons for going to war with Iraq?” Without explicitly making the assertion, the reporter implies that the President has indeed lied before about his reasons for going to war with Iraq based on the iterative ‘again.’ A less contentious presupposition can be suggested as well: that the President is a male in light of the pronoun

'his.' This example illustrates the fact that speakers or writers often express more than they assert. Their utterances or scripts convey not only their surface contents, but a great deal of auxiliary content as well.

In this subsection, the linguistic presuppositions in the requirements for a *Satyagrahi* are identified and analyzed. The concept presupposition is first defined.

The phenomenon of linguistic presupposition can be traced back to the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege (1892/1952). He raised many of the issues that later became central to the discussion of presupposition. According to Frege, "If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition (*voraussetzung*) that the simple or compound proper names used have a reference" (1952:69).

A later exchange between Bertrand Russell (1905, 1957) and Peter Strawson (1950, 1952) brought the notion of presupposition more fully into scholarly discourse. Russell, in his first essay on the subject (1905), argued that Frege's views were simply wrong. Struggling with the problem of how to account for the fact that sentences lacked proper referents, Russell came up with conclusions that were different from those of Frege.

Russell's analysis remained unchallenged until Strawson, in his 1950 essay, suggested a different approach. For Strawson, many of the puzzles in Russell's essay emerged from a failure to distinguish sentences from uses of sentences to make, for instance, statements that are true or false. Consider the following sentences:

- (1) The President of the United States is a warmonger.
- (2) The President of the United States is not a warmonger.
- (3) There is one and only one President of the United States.

In his analysis of definite descriptions, Russell suggested that propositions of the form (1) entail presuppositions of the form (3). Strawson did not agree with this suggestion. Instead, Strawson pointed out that (2), the negation of (1), does not affect the truth conditions of (3). If the relation between (1) and (3) were one of entailment, then, by *modus ponens*, i.e. the inference $p \rightarrow q$ and $\sim p$ to $\sim q$, (2) could not entail (3). One's linguistic intuitions tell her/him, however, that if *either* (1) or (2) is true, then (3) is also true. Strawson labeled the relation one of presupposition, which he formally designated as:

- (4) Sentence S_1 logically presupposes sentence S_2 if the truth of S_2 is a precondition for the truth or falsity of S_1 (1952:175).

The practical approach for distinguishing presuppositions from entailments is the employment of the traditional *constancy under negation* rule. One sentence is said to presuppose another if and only if the sentence and its negation both require it to be true.

A detailed discussion of semantic presupposition and implications for logic, presuppositional defeasibility, the projection problem, and pragmatic presupposition is not presented here. For details on these aspects, the reader can refer to Bangura (1996, 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, and 2004) and Bangura and Thomas (1998).

The following presuppositions are extracted from Gandhi's requirements for a *Satyagrahi*:

- (1) One can have faith in God.
- (2) One can believe in truth and nonviolence as a creed.
- (3) One can have faith in the inherent goodness of nature.
- (4) Truth and love can be expressed through suffering.
- (5) One can live a chaste life.
- (6) One can give up his life and possessions for his/her cause.
- (7) One can be a habitual khaki-wearer and spinner.
- (8) One can be a teetotaler and abstain from other intoxicants.
- (9) One can obey all rules of discipline with a willing heart.
- (10) One can obey jail rules not devised to hurt his/her self-respect.

Presuppositions (1), (2), (4), (6), (7), and (10) are triggered by the implicative predicates “must have,” “must believe,” “must be leading,” “must be,” “must carry out,” and “should carry out.” As Karttunen (1971:340) pointed out, implicative predicates carry presuppositions that represent a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of their complement sentences. An asserted main sentence with an implicative verb commits the writer/speaker to an implied presupposition which consists of a complement sentence as augmented by the tense and other modifiers of the main sentence.

Presuppositions (3), (5), (8), and (9) are triggered by the factive verbs “have,” “be,” and “devised.” Factive verbs, according to Kiparski (1971:345-346), trigger the presuppositions of their clausal complements.

Indeed, the preceding presupposition triggers carry presuppositions of some necessary and sufficient conditions which determine whether the requirements for a *Satyagrahi* can be met. The main statements of the requirements can thus be looked upon as statements about whether the decisive conditions envisioned for a *Satyagrahi* can be fulfilled, and under what spatial and temporal circumstances.

This is good to know because these presupposition triggers indicate the sort of range of presuppositional phenomena Gandhi had for developing *Satyagraha*. This set of core phenomena will make it possible for the examination in future research of some further basic properties that Gandhi's presuppositions exhibit.

Implicatures

The notion of linguistic implicature does not have an extensive history like presupposition or many other topics in pragmatics. The idea of implicature can be traced back to Grice's (1975, 1978) theory of conversational implicature. This theory, according to Grice (1975:45), is derived from a general principle of conversation called the *cooperative principle* plus a number of maxims which speakers will normally obey. Levinson (1983:100n), however, noted that there was considerable speculation within philosophy about the utility of the notion of pragmatic implication, and some proto-Gricean ideas appear in Fogelin (1967).

The term implicature, as used by Grice, accounts for what a speaker (or a writer) can imply, suggest, or mean, as distinguished from what the speaker (or the writer) literally says (or writes). Linguistic implicatures, Grice suggested, are determined by “the conventional meaning of the words used” (1975:44).

Implicature is, therefore, an important unit of linguistic analysis for at least five reasons, following Levinson (1983:97-100). First, the concept of implicature offers some significant functional explanations of linguistic facts because the sources of this concept can be shown to lie outside the organization of language, in some general principles for cooperative interaction. And yet the principles have a pervasive effect upon the structure of language. This makes implicature a paradigmatic example of the nature and power of pragmatic explanations of linguistic phenomena.

Second, implicature provides some explicit account of how it is possible to mean more than what is actually said or written. Put differently, the concept allows an analyst to identify more than what is literally expressed by the conventional sense of the linguistic expressions uttered or written.

Third, implicature seems likely to effect substantial simplifications in both the structure and the content of semantic descriptions. For the semanticist, the distinct senses of a word can be declared simply ambiguous, or it can be claimed that the meanings of words are, in general, vague and protean and are influenced by collocational environments.

Fourth, the notion of implicature seems to be essential when various basic facts about language are to be accounted for properly. For example, particles like *well* and *by the way* require some meaning specification in a theory of meaning just like other words in English; but when a linguist comes to consider what their meaning is, s/he will find her/himself referring to the pragmatic mechanisms that produce implicatures.

Finally, the principles that generate implicatures possess a very general explanatory power in the sense that a few basic principles provide explanations for a large array of apparently unrelated facts. Examples suggested and discussed by Levinson (1983:100-166) include why English has no lexical item *nall*, meaning ‘not all,’ why Aristotle got his logic wrong, ‘Moore's paradox,’ how obvious tautologies like *War is war* can convey any conceptual import, and how metaphors work and many other phenomena besides.

Grice (1975) suggested that the essential properties of implicatures are largely predictable. He isolated four characteristic properties that can be employed to test for implicatures. These characteristic properties are: (a) *cancellability* or *defeasibility*, (b) *non-detachability*, (c) *calculability*, and (d) *non-conventionality*. A possible fifth characteristic property of implicature can be referred to as “multiplicity”—that is, what Levinson (1983:117-118) referred to as “an expression with a single meaning (which) can give rise to different implicatures on different occasions, and indeed on any one occasion the set of associated implicatures may not be exactly determinable” (Levinson attributed this definition to Wilson and Sperber 1981).

Not discussed here is the projection problem. For this notion, the reader can consult Bangura (1996, 1997, 2000, 2002a, 2002b, and 2004).

Existing in Gandhi’s requirements for a *Satyagrahi* are the following implicatures:

- (1) There is a God.
- (2) Truth and nonviolence comprise a creed.
- (3) Human nature is inherently good.
- (4) Suffering is an expression of truth and love.
- (5) A chaste life can be lived.
- (6) Readiness and willingness are necessary to give up life and possessions for a cause.
- (7) Khaki-wearing and spinning can be a habit.
- (8) Teetotaling involves being free of all intoxicants.
- (9) A willing heart is necessary to obey all of the rules of discipline.
- (10) Jail rules can be devised to hurt one’s self-pride.

These implicatures, as stated earlier, are triggered by the following implicative predicates: “must have,” “must believe,” “must be leading,” “must be,” “must carry out,” and “should carry out.” As also noted earlier, implicative predicates carry presuppositions that reflect a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of their complement sentences. Furthermore, an asserted main sentence with an implicative verb commits the writer/speaker to an applied proposition which consists of a complement sentence as suggested by the tense and other modifiers of the main sentence.

In the preceding analysis, I have somehow limited the number of possible implicatures that can be delineated from the text. This is because the implications one can draw from some act are much broader than meaning in natural language. There is also a real danger based on the fact that a contradiction implies anything and everything. All self-contradictory concepts must have precisely the same meaning, namely everything. Unfortunately, the theory of implicature has not yet developed limits to prevent this.

Speech Acts

This subsection is about the speech acts in the text of the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*. First, a synopsis about the theory is presented. Second, the speech acts in the text are discussed.

Speech Act Theory postulates that the utterance of certain sentences, must, in special environments, be seen as the performance of an act, either direct or indirect. The notion of speech acts can be traced to the works of two major linguistic philosophers: J. L. Austin (1962) and J. R. Searle (1969).

In 1962, Austin observed that, while sentences can often be used to report state of affairs, the utterance of some sentences, in special cases, are to be treated as the performance of an act. Such sentences, suggested Austin, can be called *Performatives*, and the special circumstances required for their success, he referred to as *a set of felicity conditions*. By extension, Austin proposed that in uttering any sentence (*a Locutionary Act*), a speaker can be seen to have performed some act (*an Illocutionary Act*). Associated with each illocutionary act is the *Force* of the utterance that can be interpreted as a performative like “promise,” “warn,” etc. Austin also pointed out that, in uttering a sentence, a speaker also performs a *Perlocutionary Act*, which is described in terms of the effect the illocutionary act, at the particular time in use, has on the hearer.

Seven years later (1969), Searle introduced a variation between *direct* and *indirect* speech acts which depends on the recognition of the intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a given occasion. For Searle, indirect speech acts are cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another. To support this proposition, he provided his now famous example, "Can you pass the salt?," and proposed two ways it can be interpreted: (1) it can be seen as a question about the hearer's *ability* to pass the salt; (2) it can be interpreted as a *request* for the action of passing the salt.

The use of Speech Act Theory in studying language phenomena is, thus, important because it provides an account of how some apparently formally unconnected statements go together in discourse to form a coherent sequence. However, there is a general problem with such an approach, and it has been pointed out by Levinson as follows: "If one looks even curiously at a transcribed record of a conversation, it becomes immediately clear that we do not know how to assign speech acts in a non-arbitrary way" (1980:20).

More concretely, Leech (1983:207-8) has pointed out two aspects of the problem. The first aspect is that of polysemy: i.e. some verbs are so versatile that they can fit both syntactically and semantically into more than one category. For instance, *advise*, *suggest*, and *tell* can either be classified as assertive or directive. Thus, according to Leech, our classification should not be so much a classification of verbs, but one of verb SENSES.

The second aspect, according to Leech, is that certain verbs, such as *greet* (which is simply followed by a direct object), do not take clausal complementizers, although semantically they must imply one. To solve this shortcoming, Leech suggested that the analyst could do what Searle suggested by stipulating that the syntactic frames that go with each verb category are 'deep structures' which may appear in surface structure in various disguises. Leech also suggested that the analyst can replace the 'deep structure' analysis by an analysis at the semantic representation level, where one is "no longer concerned with speech-act verbs, but rather with the speech-act PREDICATES which they realize, and where the reported utterance is represented by a metapositional argument" (Leech 1983:208).

Moreover, as Brown and Yule also have argued,

The problem with identifying speech acts should not necessarily lead the analyst to abandon their investigation. Rather, it should lead the analyst to recognize that the way speech acts are conventionally classified into discrete act-types such as 'request,' 'promise,' 'warn,' etc. may lead to an inappropriate view of what speakers do with utterances (1978:233).

What solidifies this axiom (i.e. Speech Acts Theory), despite the fact that it had been traditionally subsumed under the rubric of *Theoretical Linguistics*, is the notion of *Sociolinguistics*: i.e. the desire to capture how languages are embedded in the surrounding frameworks of cultures and social institutions.

A detailed discussion of Austin and Searle's works, and how to do things with words is absent here. The interested reader can refer to Bangura (2000, 2002a, 2002b, and 2004).

An examination of Gandhi's requirements for a *Satyagrahi* makes it possible to tease out the following speech acts imbedded in them:

Type	Speech Act
Commissive	(1) He must have a living faith in God. (2) He must believe in truth and nonviolence as his creed. (3) He must have faith in the inherent goodness of human nature. (4) He must expect to evoke truth and love through his suffering. (5) He must live a chaste life. (6) He must be ready and willing for the sake of his cause to give up his life and possessions. (7) He must be a habitual khaki-wearer and spinner.

- (8) He must be a teetotaler.
- (9) He must be free from the use of other intoxicants.
- (10) He must obey with a willing heart all the rules of discipline as may be laid down from time to time.
- (11) He should obey the jail rules unless they are especially devised to hurt his self-respect.

Interestingly, all of the speech acts in the requirements for a *Stayagrahi* are commissives. These speech acts seek to get one to commit himself/herself to have faith in God, to believe in truth and non-violence, to have faith in the inherent goodness of human nature, to evoke truth and love through suffering, to live a chaste life, to be willing to give up his/her life and possessions for the sake of his/her cause, to be a habitual khaki-wearer and spinner, to be a teetotaler, to be free of all intoxicants, to be willing to obey all rules of discipline, and to obey jail rules that are not devised to hurt his/her self-respect. These are triggered by the verbs “have,” “believe,” “expect,” “be,” and “carry.”

In essence, most of the speech act types are absent in the requirements for a *Satyagrahi*. There are no representatives (those that commit a speaker/writer to something being the case), no imperatives (those that attempt to get someone to do something, either modest or fierce), no expressives (those that express a psychological state), and no declaratives (those that alternate status or a condition by declaration).

Understanding the Pragmatic Linguistic Features in the Text

From the preceding analysis, at least three content categories can be delineated within which the pragmatic linguistic features can be subsumed: (1) *Satyagraha* as a moral truth, (2) *Satyagraha* as a peaceful weapon, and (3) forms and techniques of *Satyagraha*. Explanations of these pragmatic linguistic categories are important because any social scientific endeavor must seek to provide general explanations to “Why?” questions. In this case, why are the preceding linguistic categories evident in the text examined? When social scientists attempt to explain why a given phenomenon took place, they must provide a systematic and empirical analysis of these antecedent factors in the given situation that made possible the occurrence of that phenomenon.

Satyagraha as a Moral Truth

Early in his life, Gandhi became an opponent of injustice, oppression, and falsehood. His passion for truth was, thus, innate in him and this was what led him to the path of *Satyagraha*. In addition to being a peaceful idea and movement, *Satyagraha* also became part of the moral philosophy that guided and influenced the Mahatma’s life. One thing that took deep root in Gandhi was, in his own words, “the conviction that morality is the basis of things and that truth is the substance of morality. Thus truth became my sole objective” (Diwakar 1948:11). Correspondingly, the power of truth, love and justice comprise the force that guides *Satyagraha*. In opposition to injustice and violence, *Satyagraha* calls for the use of love and truth to combat evil and solve the ills of the world. As such, it is an active movement that calls for the sacrifice and duty of the *Satyagrahis* to fight against violence, not through the use of sanguinary weapons, but through the weapons of truth, love and, essentially, nonviolence. As Gandhi once described it, *Satyagraha* “is essentially an active movement, much more active than the one involving the use of sanguinary weapons. Truth and non-violence are perhaps the [most active] weapons you have in the world,” and “this internal weapon acts asleep or awake,” for it is “not a negative but positive force” (Mathews 1989:68).

In relation to *Satyagraha*, there exists a variety of concepts which equate to this movement, such as civil disobedience, non-cooperation, civil resistance, nonviolent resistance or nonviolent non-cooperation, constructive program, truth and Ahimsa or nonviolence. In this light, Gandhi established a relationship between these terms by comparing *Satyagraha* to a tree from which the previous concepts emanate as its branches: “the whole tree is *Satyagraha*” (Mathews 1989:78). More specifically, he compared it to a banyan tree with a multiple trunk and many branches. The tree is rooted in Truth or Absolute Reality, and its branches are the forms by which we search and find the one Truth and Reality. These are the outer manifestations of the inner search for Truth: i.e. the means by which we can seek the Truth and Ultimate Reality through nonviolence or Constructive Program. Together, they form the path that leads to *Satyagraha*.

Satyagraha as a Peaceful Weapon

The importance of *Satyagraha* hinges upon the fact that it is based on truth and love, and it was made to conquer ills such as injustice and violence. Consequently, it is also a weapon of justice and nonviolence. It fights through compassion and brings down the opponent with love rather than blood. The means of *Satyagraha* were made for this sole purpose, with the goal of instructing the opponent rather than inflicting pain, harm, or death on him/her. The use of violence will not serve to eradicate violence, but to make it greater. Thus, we must fight violence through greater means, more powerful and effective, and that will serve to spread our message and not contradict it. The search for truth, which is the main goal for the *Satyagrahi*, makes no room for violence, since the ultimate goal is *Satyagraha*: i.e. the use of Soul-Force, Truth-Force, or Love-Force to combat evil and create peace.

Therefore, the pursuit of truth entails no violence. Rather, it deals with the opponent, not by inflicting pain or hatred, but through the force of love and compassion. Since it is truth that guides him/her, truth must also be the ultimate end; and there is no violence, or hatred, or pain. Instead, the opponent is treated with respect and submission. The main task for the *Satyagrahi* is to attempt to overcome the opponent by making him/her realize the ill s/he has committed through patience and sympathy, even if it means undertaking severe suffering, pain, or even death. This is the way in which *Satyagraha* fights injustice. As the Mahatma urged,

In the application of *Satyagraha* I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be truth to one may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on one's self" (Gandhi 1951:6).

Thus, truth is achieved through patience, sympathy and self-suffering, not through hatred, pain, violence, or death of the opponent. The duty of the *Satyagrahi* is to fight for the truth, and only with truth alone.

In essence, although it has been claimed to be the way of the weak, the path of *Satyagraha* has proven to be the task of the strong. Unlike those who engage in violence or hatred and resort to the use of sanguinary weapons, which act as covers or shields for their cowardice, those who follow the path of *Satyagraha* are stronger, both in body and mind, to fight through greater means which will cause them pain or even death. As Gandhi once said, "The path of truth is for the brave alone, never for a coward" (Iyer 1990:222). As such, in order to instruct the opponent on his/her wrongdoing, the *Satyagrahi* must go as far as accepting death with the use of the only permissible weapons: love, patience, sympathy, and compassion. According to Gandhi, "*Satyagraha* used in direct action does not aim at appealing to reason. Rather, it attempts to reach the opponent's reason through the heart" (Mathews 1989:81). The self-suffering on the part of the *Satyagrahi*, thus, has an educative effect on the opponent, calling attention to injustice as well as arousing public sentiment. Therefore, it does not appeal to reason directly but through the heart, with the force of the soul, truth and love, which are the only means to transform reason.

One of the basic assumptions of *Satyagraha* is the essential goodness of human nature. As such, the *Satyagrahi* "looks upon none as his enemy. Everyone is a friend, a fellow being, a brother" (Diwakar 1948:22). Therefore, the *Satyagrahi* should not attempt to injure the opponent but, rather, to destroy the evil without injuring the evildoer. Instead of physically resisting wrong, s/he "attempts to reach the heart of the wrongdoer" by suffering cheerfully (Diwakar 1948:22). By suffering and assuring the opponent of his/her physical safety, the *Satyagrahi* causes his/her opponent to think about the wrong s/he has committed. Thus, his/her attack is on the opponent's mind, and s/he aims at curing evil at its source.

Another important aspect of *Satyagraha* is its relation with *Ahimsa*, nonviolence. As stated by Gandhi, "Ahimsa and Truth are my two lungs. I cannot live without them" (Mathews 1989:68). Therefore, there is an intrinsic connection between both concepts; and as mentioned earlier, nonviolence is part of *Satyagraha* as one of its major branches. Consequently, *Satyagraha* and nonviolence, resistance, suffering, patience and compassion all go hand-in-hand in search for the ultimate truth, the path by which we oppose evil, wrong, and injustice through the power of love, mercy, and compassion, all done with the will of nonviolence and the skills of forgiveness. In this light, to Gandhi, evil must be turned into good, injustice must be fought with justice, hatred must be conquered with love, and untruth must be erased with the power of truth. From here arise his conceptualizations of truth and nonviolence, since

the one leads to the other. Truth is to be achieved through nonviolence, and we can only resist violence through the force of truth. In Gandhi's words, "Resist not evil with evil, but resist evil with good at all costs. But at any rate, resist. Resistance is better than cowardly nonresistance" (Diwakar 1948:26). Gandhi also added that we must insist on the strength of the *Satyagrahi* and oppose the weakness of the soldier (Diwakar 1948:26).

Forms and Techniques of Satyagraha

As *Satyagraha* includes both purification and suffering, the forms *Satyagraha* might take would be based on these as well as on patience, service, and sacrifice. Due to the nature of *Satyagraha*, its essential elements—truth, compassion, love, suffering, duty, and patience—may be classified into three main stages: constructive, purificatory, and aggressive (Diwakar 1948:42).

The constructive stage is that which deals with the organization and preparation for *Satyagraha*. At this stage, the task lies in preparing the people to participate through means such as the selection of clear issues, recruitment and mobilization, organization and training. For Gandhi, the interest lay not in the number of volunteers for *Satyagraha*, but in their quality. As such, he expected much from his volunteers and posed the list of requirements (analyzed for their pragmatic linguistic content earlier) by which they should abide.

The second stage, i.e. purification, includes techniques such as fasting, the practice of silence, *hartal* (the cessation of business out of respect, or for mourning, or as a protest), prayer meetings, vows, and pledges. Also included are other self-denying actions which illustrate the cleansing and purificatory forms of *Satyagraha* (Mathews 1989:88).

Following the completion of the constructive and purificatory stages, the *Satyagrahi* is then prepared to undertake the third stage—that of aggression—in which the attack on evil is effected through direct action, with techniques such as non-cooperation, civil disobedience, boycott, and other measures, even serving jail sentence. Any of these actions should be done with a full understanding of the consequences (Mathews 1989:102).

Conclusion

In sum, we can say that *Satyagraha*, the matchless weapon, is the means of the strong, the good-willed, and the full-hearted. It is the force of the Soul, the current of Love, the path of Truth, and the search for Reality. Its necessary skills of pain, suffering, and commitment make *Satyagraha* a movement of the strong and powerful, as it attempts to correct the world, not through inflicting equal pain, but through the overwhelming power of Love.

Indeed, as Gandhi once said, "Ruled by Love, the world goes on." He added: "If ill-will were the chief motive-force, the world would have been destroyed long ago," but "We are alive solely because of love" (Gandhi in Holmes 1990:52). Thus, it is the power of Love alone that can save the world; and as conceived by Gandhi, the power of Love and Truth is capable of destroying the greatest evils. And it is this belief that made Gandhi's *Satyagraha* the movement it became. To Gandhi, Truth is the one Reality; and in order to achieve this Ultimate Truth, we can only fight with the weapons of Truth itself.

In the rest of this conclusion, I present a résumé of ideas which emerged during my preoccupation with this work. As always, in the application of academic ideas to vital documents such as symbolic texts, there is the very real possibility of the premature acceptance of untested concepts and theories. The analyst must, therefore, shoulder the responsibility of pointing out the limitations of current approaches (as is done in the preceding section) and to demonstrate the empirical basis for the working categories employed. It is for this reason that this essay surveyed many approaches in linguistic pragmatics.

The analysis in the preceding section shows that pragmatic analyses can be glossed as 'covert factors making the overt coherent.' Real-world factors determined the intralinguistic, grammatical choices of Gandhi, the author of *Satyagraha*. Social-world factors covertly determined their overt, intralinguistic grammars differently.

Since semantic representation should be able to identify tautologies, contradictions, anomalies and paraphrases, it must be able to compare *given* (overt, occurrent) bits with the rest of language, infinite

resources which are covert, non-occurrent. This pairing task can appear simple at a categorical competence level, daunting at the boundaries of lexical, contextualized performance level.

Presupposition, for instance, can designate a state, process or action. These three possibilities correspond to some ambiguities in linguists' use of that expression. Presupposition may be coherently said to *inhere* in language viewed as a state, to *emerge* in language viewed as a process, or to be something languages cause when considered as actions. Questions about presupposition become relevant or unanswerable, depending on these points of view.

We can ask if a state is absolute or relative, inherent or resultant from a process or an action; or process, we can ask under what conditions they occur. We ask who is responsible for actions and effects of instruments. Questions that have been raised, therefore, have included (a) Who or what presupposes? (b) What is covert and overt? (c) What is to be said about overt expressions for which only overt incoherence can be found? Notice that "coherence" sidesteps vexing questions about "truth."

Distinguishing sense and reference involves different norms for determining synonymy and its consequences in semantic interpretation of truth-conditions. If existence (a basic concern in presuppositions) must be decided on empirical testability, differences about "truth" and "meaning" are predictable. While a normative solution to these questions is not obvious, some of the sources of confusion are. By examining the terms involved, and some assumptions of linguists considered in this essay, the danger of confusing a gloss with a translation can be pointed out, if not avoided. In this perplexing area, a short sketch can prepare only for caution, not sure interpretation.

In non-technical usage, the terms imply, infer, and entail are often used indiscriminately. Sometimes, it is clear that (a) the point of view shifts from viewing language as a state, process, or action; and (b) from viewing language as an Agent to that of an Instrument employed by an Agent. Once this stance has been identified, the status of presuppositions is still to be determined as coherent or incoherent within each metaphor. Distinctions commonly recognized involve norms such as (a) overt versus covert; (b) simultaneous versus successive, with the priorities based either on time, logic, psychologically explicit advertence and the like.

In general usage, a covert *Implication* can be distinguished from an overt *assertion* and an implicit *entailment* from an explicit *conclusion*. An *inference* is ambiguously contained in texts or made by people. Both *implicatures* and *inferences* can be inexplicit in textual or human terms, while a *deduction* is explicit in both. *Inference* can be a process or action appropriate to people who *infer*, while both texts and people can be ambiguously said to *imply*. A *deduction* can be an act or process, while deducibility is a state. All of these involve analogous (systematically ambiguous) notions of *necessity*, which involve a kind of *priority* or *simultaneity* (temporal, logical, natural). Usage is confused when the type of *necessity* or *priority* is inexplicit or undecidable.

Modern scientific statements made in the linguistic form 'If...then' can be referred to as implicatures. This *form* is a Constant. What might fill it? Variables. The constant formal relations are independent of the material (substantive) nature of variables filling them, so formal validity and truth are inextricably related, in that, given true premises and a valid form, a conclusion must be true.

Stated this way, a *system* is presented as a network of dependence (e.g., grammatical and phonological systems) and a *system of systems* (a meta-system per se) allows both for independent and interdependent relations between them. Presupposition currently looks particularly to the syntax of what is overtly asserted and covertly taken for granted in a true or false context. Linguistic pragmatic usage involves contexts where truth or falsity are not involved, but appropriateness is in question.

This is a point at which ambiguity necessarily arises. But ambiguity can be shown to be systematic, and a term like "presuppose" analogical, if its sense (and possible reference) can be established as clear in a defining environment and the differences calculated from the defining differences of other environments. The clearest logical instance is *existential presupposition*; less clear are grammatical, social, psychological, and other factors which are demanded, tolerated or excluded in semantic interpretation.

Assuming normal, unmarked, non-contrastive sentences which do not *assert* existence, a subject is taken as old information (so can be presupposed), a predicate as new (so normally asserted). Without a distinction of *sense* and *reference*, anomalies arise when the sole norm of truth and falsity is referential. Sentences consisting of words that have independent 'sense' allow at least a grammatical

presupposition of “existence” identical in affirmation and negation, but if that is excluded referentially in the assertion, its negation must be logically ‘true’: if an assertion is ‘false,’ its negation must be ‘true.’

Necessities of language can be distinguished from those of real-world conditions, and both from psychological constructs. Even scientific theories properly ‘reside’ in thought where their substantial condition is conceptual; both this abstracted status and the states of affairs to which they can be reduced are different from the conventions of language in which they are expressed. Logicians now employ the notion of “possible worlds,” within which real-world incoherence (and truth or falsity defined in those terms) can be neutralized, so stressing the formality of their enterprise. It reminds one of the time when Nuclear Bombs only ‘existed’ in physicists’ heads.

So, the first matter of *Satyagraha* we ought to consider is its dual nature: (a) as an aesthetic human experience, which not only gives pleasure but also teaches life in varying degrees of intensity (an individual re-creates what has been created by the author); and (2) as the object of study, or of our intellectual curiosity. One might well ask the professor of Peace Studies whether in his/her teaching, and even in his/her research, s/he recognizes the inseparable nature of these aspects of *Satyagraha*.

Satyagraha can no longer be considered merely an adventitious or decorative object in life or in culture; it must be seen rather as one of the deepest expressions of the ethos of a people. Professors of Peace Studies cannot ignore this reality: *Satyagraha* is *life*, readily available to the hearer/reader and full of humanizing tension. If *Satyagraha* is a transcendental aesthetic experience which not only is *present* in the ‘then’ and ‘there’ of the text and the feelings of the author but can also *be moving toward* the ‘here’ and ‘now’ of the hearer/reader, then, the Peace Studies student ought to be considered first of all as a *hearer/reader*. And in order to help him/her be a real hearer/reader—the best possible hearer/reader, we have to make him/her see that being such a hearer/reader comes near to being a writer: a writer or an author in the widest meaning of the word, but in a passive sense one who re-creates in his/her hearing/reading what was felt and intuited by the original, active author.

We might propose as a starting point that all studies of peaceful creeds, even on the most elementary levels, aim at the following objectives. First, we must stress the uniqueness of the creed-aesthetic experience, an act of creed per se; and recognize that to fail to enter into the imaginative creed of ‘speaker/writer-hearer/reader’ may be whatever else one wishes, but most certainly is not to come to grips with the essence of the creeds. To abstain from this aesthetic experience of being a ‘participant’ is, in the final analysis, not to study the creeds.

Second, we should give the hearer/reader such scholarly assistance (historical, philosophical, sociological, political, and linguistic contexts, etc.) as may be necessary to illustrate and help him/her understand and place the text in the ‘then’ and ‘there’ in which it was conceived. But all effort along these lines ought to be subordinate to the first one, the aesthetic purpose.

Finally, we should orient the hearer/reader of the creeds in the search for ethical implications which all works pose. The moral responsibility (or irresponsibility) of an author is inseparable from his/her aesthetic vision. In this way, the hearer/reader would examine the value of the text in a dual perspective—ethical and aesthetic—and new dimensions would be added to the traditional historical-philosophical analysis.

To study creeds in this way as a deeply-rooted manifestation of life would lead to a better understanding of the customs, the social institutions, and the individual historical events of institutions. The creeds would also provide an approach to the visual arts, whose deeper meanings often escape the eye of the uninitiated observer because of his/her tendency to isolate cultural phenomena from their context in order to judge them in the context of his/her own culture where these phenomena may have little or no meaning or a totally mistaken one.

We ought never to falsify the cultural reality (life, art, literature) which is the goal of the student’s study. We would, thus, have to oppose all sorts of simplified, or supposedly simplified, texts and stress instead the methods which will achieve the best possible access to real life, language and philosophy.

The observations I have made in this conclusion are not directed at the discovery of any method or pedagogical panacea. I present them in complete modesty in the belief that what matters most is not the method but the professor. May my observations serve then, at best, as a starting point for that self-examination. Since teaching about peace and other academic phenomena is one to which many of us are deeply committed, I venture to address my colleagues in the profession with the hope that

they will not only give serious consideration to my suggestions and perplexities, but also strive to suggest better solutions than those I have here proposed.

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